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Abstract: 
How does vote intention in presidential elections vary according to the economic 
conditions of a country, especially indicators of the financial market? Does the state of 
the economy, both its fundamentals as well as capital market, affect variation in 
candidates’ percentage of vote intention in national polls? This paper tests how economic 
indicators influence vote intention in presidential elections in two emerging markets: 
Brazil and Mexico. The presidential elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Brazil 
and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico are analyzed using all poll returns for each electoral period 
and corresponding economic data. The paper finds that no theory is capable of explaining 
results throughout the dataset but partisan explanations and Stokes’ (2001) categories of 
alternatives to retrospective voting help elucidate vote intention. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to build on previous research on vote intention and behavior 
(Stokes 2001, Alesina et al 1997) to understand how economic and financial data affect 
vote intention in Brazilian and Mexican presidential elections. Brazil and Mexico are the 
largest countries in Latin America and have both democratized in recent decades. Both 
countries have very important emerging markets that have generated enthusiasm as well 
as crises within other emerging markets. The role of political risk in these markets has 
been central and drove much of crisis in Mexico in 1994 and Brazil in 1998 and 2002 
(Spanakos and Renno, 2009). As Whitehead has argued, risk in emerging markets 
normally heightens before and after elections (2006). Not surprisingly, not only are 
financial analysts and policy-makers paying close attention to economic and financial 
data, increasingly so are voters. 
This paper explores the question of whether economic and financial data affect 
vote intention. Renno and Spanakos (2006) claimed that country risk evaluations, 
measured by bond spreads, were quite sensitive to poll results in Brazil, but that the 
inverse was not true: polls did not vary so much because of risk assessment. In a more 
recent study, comparing distinct countries in Latin America, they find that risk 
assessments were sensitive in some elections, but not others and that there was no clear 
pattern that the rise of left-wing parties to government increased risk evaluations 
(Spanakos and Renno, 2009). 
This paper attempts to evaluate, in a comparative perspective, how sensitive vote 
intentions (vote for left-wing parties) are to the state of the fundamentals of the economy 
(inflation and unemployment) and financial market indicators (country risk evaluations, 
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exchange rates) controlling for various international indicators of instability (VIX, 
commodity prices), Central Bank independence and political variables (party system age, 
country specific effects and causal heterogeneity by electoral episode). This is, therefore, 
an initial attempt to measure how the economy and financial markets affect vote 
intentions in a comparative perspective focusing on emerging markets. 
 
2. Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective 
Studies about how the economy affects elections abound and have many 
ramifications. There are those based on individual level data evaluating pocketbook and 
sociotropic economic vote; there are studies of aggregate level data investigating how 
economic outcomes affect government evaluation and vote in the developing and 
developed world; and there are studies about how financial markets influence 
government evaluation. On the other hand, there are no studies on how financial markets, 
controlling for the state of the economy’s fundamentals, influence vote intentions 
comparing several elections in two developing nations. This present paper attempts to fill 
this gap. 
No single theory can explain the complex relationship between political moments, 
such as elections, and financial and economic variables. The central claim in this paper is 
that a combination of global economic conditions, local aspects of the financial market, 
and the fundamentals of national economies must be considered in explaining variations 
in vote intention in developing countries. Furthermore, the effects of the distinct 
explanatory variables will vary by electoral period, depending on clarity of the 
candidates’ rhetoric and incumbents’ performance. 
2A. Partisan Models 
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While classical partisan models of political economy emphasize how the partisan 
identity of a government impacts economic indicators in developed countries (Hibbs 
1977, Alesina et al 1997), recent contributions analyze developing countries and give 
more attention to the way electoral periods affect financial markets as opposed to 
macroeconomic indicators. Using financial market data from 1975-1998 for 78 
developing countries,  David Leblang (2002) found that speculative attacks are most 
likely to occur during a Left-wing government and after an election.  Vaaler et al, using 
data from 20 developing countries find that financial markets are most concerned about a 
shift to the left during elections, but not the reelection of a candidate of the left (Block 
and Vaaler 2004; Vaaler, et al 2006). These studies seem to confirm the basic premises of 
partisan theories: 1) that market actors distinguish politicians of the left and the right; 2) 
once in office politicians justify such distinctions; 3) market actors make investment 
decisions during electoral periods based upon the ideology of the likely victor. 
Though very interesting, these studies, as large N studies, are limited by the need 
to maintain comparability of data (George and Bennett 2005, 19).  For example, they face 
a problem of what Herron calls “magnitude of partisanship,” or how far the distance is 
between left and right (2000: 327). Investors are unlikely to consider the partisan effect 
of a Michael Foot or a Tony Blair identical, though statistical analysis labels them both 
“left.” Similarly, if Castañeda is correct, there should be markedly different responses to 
Latin America’s moderate, institutionalist left and its radical, populist and anti-
institutionalist left (Castañeda and Navia 2007). Moreover, even if the left-right divide 
can be assumed to be equivalent in large N studies, the analyst must also understand their 
meaning in terms of the institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring 1999). 
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To deal with these issues, a specific variable for party system institutionalization, 
which conditions the clarity of party’s ideology and “brand names,” is included in the 
current model (Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Second, the model investigates in detail the 
role of partisan explanations vis-à-vis other theories through an in-depth discussion of 
each election. The hypotheses derived from these theories are that left-wing parties 
should benefit from deterioration in employment and not be so harmed by deterioration in 
inflation. 
2B. Restrospective Economic Voting 
 The literature on vote choice places a very strong emphasis on economic voting. 
The argument here is very simple: voters punish and reward incumbents for their 
performance in office. The main form of holding representatives accountable for their 
performance in office is for voters to reelect a politician or party based on his or her 
perception of the current state of the economy. Satisfaction leads to a vote for the 
incumbent and dissatisfaction the opposition. Hence, the central claim of this literature is 
that voters focus more on the incumbent performance as reflected by economic 
conditions, and less on partisan or ideological issues (Fiorina 1981). 
 Hence, the expectation here is that deterioration in the economy would lead to 
support of the opposition. If a left-wing party is in the opposition, it will benefit from 
weaker economic performance: If the left-wing party is the incumbent, it will suffer from 
weaker economic performance. 
2C. Global constraints  
 New partisan research recognizes the importance of ‘contextual variation,’ 
specifically that “in small, open economies, domestic policy makers may retain less 
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autonomy over some policies… than in larger, less-exposed economies” (Franzese 2002, 
371). External constraints upon domestic policy-making have long been a concern in 
Latin America and much of the international political economy literature seems to argue 
that globalization weakens the role of domestic politics making autonomous policy-
making impossible (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Garrett 1998, Wallerstein 2004).  
Susan Strange warned that while “states were once the masters of markets, now it 
is markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states” 
(in Garrett 1998, 787). In his study of capital mobility and development in Latin America 
Mahon (1996) finds support for the idea of a virtual senate of asset-holders because of 
constraints they impose on domestic policy and a similar argument is made by Mosley 
(2003) who argues that investors have a powerful voice in emerging market countries’ 
political arenas. 
 Without a doubt, world commodity prices and risk tolerance on global capital 
markets play a fundamental role in providing constraints and opportunities for emerging 
markets. Similarly, capital flows into/out of one emerging market are often very 
influenced by events in another emerging market or in the region as a whole. But 
contagion is often exaggerated and bondholders do distinguish on the basis of policy 
choices and investment climates particular to an emerging market. Still, this paper tests 
whether the global conditions influence domestic politics by including variables that 
capture the overall level of risk and openness of international markets. 
2D. Variations in Vote Calculi 
 Stokes (2001a) has made a significant effort in comparing how the economy 
affects vote choice in developing countries by arguing that the impact of the economy on 
 7 
elections is not as straightforward or evident as it is in the developed world. The main 
tenets in the developing world are that a decline in economic performance will encourage 
voters to vote for the opposition. Given that elections in developed countries have certain 
attributes absent in the new democratic regimes, like alternation in power, strong party 
reputations, and clear programmatic proposals by candidates, the choices seem simpler in 
more consolidated democratic regimes. 
In Latin America, the situation is much more complex since the region has not 
only recently witnessed transitions to democracy (still contentious in many countries) but 
also lived through very dramatic processes of economic stabilization and reform. The 
politics of economic stabilization eventually resolved deep issues like hyperinflation but 
generated others such as recession, increased sensitivity to fluctuations in global capital 
markets, and stop-and-start economic growth (Ferrari and Spanakos 2009). In such 
turbulent economic environments, voters were willing to support politicians who 
promised long-term solutions even if generating short-term pain (Stokes 2001a). In other 
words, voters often chose incumbents and challenges that could be associated with the 
promise of, at least short-term, economic constriction. 
This is a considerable challenge to the traditional form of voting in democratic 
regimes, which expects ‘retrospective’ evaluations of the economy. To explain the puzzle 
of voters’ choice, Stokes and the various authors in her book point out that voters could 
employ various other forms of vote calculi (Stokes 2001). Voters could: adopt an 
intertemporal perspective, in which hardship in the present was seen as a necessary step 
for bonanza in the future; adopt an exonerating posture, in which the current crises was 
either be blamed factors external to the incumbent or the opposition was considered 
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worse; take an oppositionist stance, in that the incumbent is always poorly evaluated, 
independent of the economy and voters could discount changes in the aggregate economy 
if they felt that there was a real improvement/worsening in the distribution of wealth and 
resources (Stokes 2001a). 
In their analyses, the theoretical arguments above revert into expectations about 
how economic indicators, basically inflation and unemployment, should impact 
incumbent evaluations in the different countries. The main argument is that the traditional 
expectations of the economic voting literature, that when the economy goes bad, 
incumbents loose support, might not simply hold in the new democracies studied on 
Stokes edited volume. Intertemporal calculi will, for instance, lead to the fact that falling 
economic performance may lead to an increase in support for the government based on 
the expectation and government justifications that short-term losses will lead to long-term 
gains. An exonerating posture explains why, sometimes, economic factors may not be 
associated with government evaluations, as does an oppositionist approach. There is also 
the possibility that voters will maintain an ideological voting line, even if their 
representatives are less capable of producing results expected by rational partisan theories 
(Alesina et al 1997).  
Stokes’ typology is employed within the model used to analyze vote intention in 
Mexico and Brazil. The Mexican case was studied by Jorge Buendia (2001) and he found 
that Mexico is a classical case of traditional retrospective voting. Brazil was not included 
in her project, but previous studies have also identified traces of economic voting in 
Brazil. This paper adds a comparative element and includes new cases and datapoints. It 
analyzes all poll results in the year of the election for four elections in Brazil and two in 
 9 
Mexico in order to focus on vote intentions and not on government evaluations and more 
clearly argue how the economy affects votes. The addition of the 2006 election in Mexico 
is important given the controversy surrounding it; it was the first election in which the 
PRI was not an incumbent, and the first election since the 1988 debacle in which the PRD 
candidate conceivably could have won. 
Brazil and Mexico are very interesting cases because they are important emerging 
markets with recent processes of democratic transition and institution building, and they 
have both witnessed recent elections in which left-wing parties have fared quite well. 
Brazil saw the rise of Lula da Silva to government in 2002, backed by a quite unique 
political party in the Brazilian landscape. The PT is a party with deep social roots tracing 
back to social movements, labor unions and progressive church groups, the Eclesial Base 
Communities. Lula da Silva, a typical migrant from the northeast, was the first in his 
family to receive technical training. His rise to power was a watershed moment in 
Brazilian history, but one also marked by market unrest at first. As was said, 2002 was an 
interesting episode of how financial markets and vote for the left could intertwine. Still, 
Lula no just won the election, but became a favorite of financial market sectors. His 2006 
run did not activate the intense reaction of financial indicators that occurred in 2002. 
Mexico faced a potentially turbulent election in 2006, but the possible victory of 
Lopez Obrador, from the left-wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), did not 
generate the same reactions that occurred in Brazil in 2002. The fact that the 2006 
elections also saw the astonishing rise in polls of Felipe Calderón from the right-wing 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), who shot out from obscurity to wining a highly 
contested election. 
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3. Data and Variables 
This paper analyzes variation in vote intention for left-wing parties in Brazil and 
Mexico using poll results for all polls conducted in the several presidential elections 
analyzed here. The main dependent variable, therefore, is the percentage of vote 
intentions for the two main Left-wing parties in Brazil and Mexico: the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil and the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) in 
Mexico. 
These countries were selected because of the importance of their markets and 
because they display a range of partisan and policy orientations, offering a diverse set of 
situations that can be analyzed. Brazil witnessed a shift towards the left in the period 
studied. Although Mexico had no governments of the left, the candidate of the left came 
within 1% point of winning the 2006 elections. The shifts toward the left in the 2002 
election in Brazil and to a lesser extent in Mexico 2006 constitute ‘crucial cases’ in 
evaluating partisan theories (Eckstein 1975, 118). Other observations produce results 
unexpected by partisan accounts, namely: support for Lula in 2006 coincided with a 
decrease in risk; yet the reelection Cardoso (Brazil 1998) did (Spanakos and Renno, 
2009). 
The unique dataset employed here has a cross-sectional time series structure, in 
which each election (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 in Brazil and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico) is 
considered as a panel and the polls are ordered based on their dates of release. The 
dataset is quite complex because the number of polls in each election year is not identical, 
hence panels are unbalanced, and the interval between polls in each year is also unequal, 
hence lags are unequally spaced. The analysis tried to take these factors into 
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consideration by estimating models that take into account the structure of the data set and 
avoiding using lagged terms because of the unequal spacing. There is, however, a more 
significant limitation to the analysis that may attenuate the impact of economic variables 
on vote intentions in that while vote intention is measured on a daily basis, many of the 
economic variables are only available monthly. Hence, the values of the economic 
variables vary much less than that of vote intentions for the left. The ideal dataset would 
be one with daily data on the economic variables to measure also lags in how long it 
takes for economic variables to be reflected in oscillation in vote intention. Unfortunately, 
economic data is not collected with such speed. Financial market data does allow for 
daily data, but some of the older elections are beyond the period available to financial 
sector analysts, and thus the authors of this paper, and so for older elections the dataset 
uses end of the month evaluations for country risk. 
The main explanatory variables are derived from the theoretical expectations 
outlined before. The central indicator of risk is JP Morgan Chase’s EMBI. The EMBI is 
the price that investors are willing to pay for the sovereign debt of a given country at a 
specific moment in time. It is the spread of the yield of a sovereign bond relative to that 
of a US Treasury bond (considered a zero-risk benchmark) of a similar maturityi. 
Increasing in the cost of government borrowing raises the cost of borrowing across the 
economy, slowing growth and increasing indebtedness. When debt is denominated in 
foreign currency, this places additional pressures on monetary policy and foreign 
exchange reserves. 
The EMBI is not a pure measure of political risk. First, it reflects the dynamics 
within international capital markets, which are external to domestic political eventsii. 
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Second, it is largely determined by the government’s ability to pay its debt which is based 
on the size (relative to exports), maturity (how long before it must make payments), and 
composition of debt (if denominated in a foreign currency or linked to some benchmark 
rate). Finally, the EMBI includes perceptions of willingness to pay debt. Candidates 
claiming that they will not pay foreign debt while locals are starving (see Lula in the 
1980s) or governments that prioritize redistribution of assets over protection of property 
rights of asset-holders drive up political risk (Chávez since 1998).  
Despite these limitations, the EMBI is the benchmark used by bondholders and it 
is used in a number of political economy studies (Bernard and Leblang 2006, Spanakos 
and Renno 2006, Spanakos and Renno, 2009). Moreover it is the best available measure 
of investor perception of sovereign credit risk, and a baseline indicator of general credit 
risk.  
The next set of variables examines the claim that it is vulnerability to external 
events that may more strongly affect vote choice. The analysis used the level of foreign 
currency reserves as a proxy for access to foreign (hard) currency and vulnerability to 
financial crises more generally. This variable was obtained in the International Financial 
Statistics dataset from the International Monetary Fund and was logged to increase 
comparability. Since credit risk is what is being investigated and so much Latin American 
debt has been historically denominated in dollars or linked to the value of the dollar, this 
indicator is especially important. 
In addition to vulnerability to the external environment, it is also important to take 
into consideration the liquidity of the global market and its appetite for risk. Two 
variables are included in the model. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
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Volatility Index which indicates volatility over a period of 30 days in the S&P 500 is a 
widely used indicator of risk appetite among investors. Since investors consider global 
market conditions, the greater the volatility in the S&P 500, the more willing investors 
should be to purchase higher-risk instruments, such as emerging market bonds. 
Additionally, as the export profiles of the economies analyzed earn a significant 
portion of money from commodities and emerging markets are more likely to receive 
investment booms when commodity prices increase, a measure of global commodity 
prices, PALLFNFW, derived from the IMF is used. The PALLFNFW is a combined 
measure of the price indices for all fuel and non-fuel commodities. This indicator is used 
because it is the most holistic index of commodity prices and all of the governments 
analyzed here, to varying degrees, export petroleum and/or natural gas, as well as other 
commodities. 
The model also controls for indicators of the fundamentals of the economy, such 
as Consumer Price Index (CPI) and unemployment. These are the traditionally analyzed 
economic indicators in the literature and one should expect that deterioration in both of 
these factors should lead to increased support to left-wing parties, especially 
unemployment. 
Finally, the model attempts to control for political and institutional variables by 
including an indicator of Central Bank independence measured by the length of tenure of 
each bank’s president or governor (Cukierman 1992, Cukierman et al. 1992). The 
expectation is that longer tenure is perceived by investors to mean more independence 
and therefore should reduce the effect of financial indicators on vote for any party. It also 
controls for political party system institutionalization, measured as the average age of the 
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top two governing parties and the main opposition parties or a subset of according to the 
situation in each country, as defined in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001). This variable is included in the model to control for the inchoate characteristics of 
certain Latin American party systems, which could weaken the influence of parties and 
ideology on economic turbulence. The expectation is that older party systems will 
decrease risk, because it increases the “brand names” of parties.  Party system should also 
condition the uncertainty present in elections in which there are changes towards the left. 
4. Analysis 
The pooled sample of countries is analyzed using cross-sectional time-series 
linear models with feasible generalized least squares correcting for AR (1) 
autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels. Fixed effects by 
country are estimated to control for other country specific factors that are not modeled. 
For each individual electoral episode, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression is used with robust 
standard errors, correcting serious autocorrelation problems found within panels and for 
cross-panel heteroskedasticity violation. iii A lagged term of the dependent variable to 
control for possible layover effects from one month to the next is also included in the 
models, when Prais-Winsten regression is insufficient to correct for serial correlation. 
This is the case of the 2006 Brazilian presidential elections. 
Results are presented in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 analyzes the pooled sample and 
each country separately. The results indicate that vote for left-wing parties in the pooled 
sample is affected by Consumer Price Index, EMBI, VIX, Central Bank independence, 
and age of the party system. As inflation worsens, as risk increases and as Central Bank 
independence increases, vote for the left grows. That is, the left benefits from 
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deterioration of inflation and risk, and gains when financial institutions become stronger, 
increasing the credibility of the system. On the other hand, as the international financial 
environment, measured by VIX, deteriorates, vote for the left also falls. Finally, party 
age—a proxy for the stability of the party system, has an unexpected effect in that as it 
increases voters are less likely to vote for the left. 
These results, however, vary tremendously by country and by election. In Brazil, 
EMBI, VIX, and Central Bank independence have similar effects of the combined sample 
on PT vote, but commodity prices also become influential, reducing the vote for the left. 
Hence, as this specific indicator improves, a signal that the economy also improves, vote 
for the left decreases. Finally, in Mexico, only VIX, with a negative effect on vote for the 
left, has a statistically significant impact on vote for the PRD. 
(table 1 here) 
Table 2 explores variations in the effects of the independent variables by election 
year by using a Prais-Winsten Regression for each of the election years.  Again, in 
Mexico’s elections, economic variables have limited effect on vote for the PRD. The only 
variables that have a statistically significant impact on vote are political and institutional. 
The effect of party system age varies from 2000 to 2006 with the former contradicting 
expectations and the latter conforming. The fact that in 2006 the PRD was a serious 
contender and in 2000 it was not could explain the variance, as could the further 
consolidation of the democratic system. The expectation here is that as Latin American 
political party systems consolidate, parties of the left, which may have had historic 
interests in undermining the political system, are seen as increasingly viable stakeholders 
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within the system. As a result, voters can be confident that a vote for the left means 
(possible) reform not revolution. 
In Brazil, the elections of 1994 and 1998 are combined to estimate feasible 
generalized least squares with each election as a panel. This was done because the 
number of cases in each of the separate elections was too small to allow a reliable 
analysis. In 1994 and 1998, the PT candidate was the runner-up in the elections, but lost 
both elections in the first (and only) round to Fernando Henrique Cardoso from the 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). The results from these elections are the 
ones that most closely approximate expectations. That is, as unemployment increased, 
and as the exchange rate deteriorated, vote intention for the PT increased. In this way, 
vote intention followed expectations from the classical retrospective economic voting in 
which the opposition benefits from the worsening of the economy.  
However, the same result was not seen in terms of inflation. As inflation 
increased, the less likely voters were to vote for the PT. This is expected because both in 
1994 and 1998, but more clearly in the latter, the incumbent administration, closely 
associated to the control of inflation through the Real Stabilization Plan, adopted an 
exonerating posture claiming that the rise of inflation was not its responsibility. It also 
could argue that Lula had no viable alternative to the government’s plan. On the contrary, 
the PSDB government claimed credit for drastically reducing inflation in Brazil and, 
further, that they were the best equipped to maintain inflation levels low, especially in a 
deteriorating international environment. The negative effect of the VIX variable on vote 
for the left confirms this interpretation. 
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The age of the Party System also behaves as expected: the older the system, the 
more likely to support the PT.iv This was particularly evident in analysis of the 2002 
elections in which reporters argued that the PT had ‘evolved’ from a political party of 
‘pure opposition’ to a more ‘pragmatic reformer.’ Cynics, particularly after the various 
corruption scandals that plagued the first Lula administration, argued that the PT had in 
fact become exactly like all the other parties. Regardless, it is clear that voters saw the 
democratic and capitalist system of Brazil less at risk from a PT presidency in 2002 and 
2006 than they had in earlier elections. 
The variables that measure risk, both domestic and country-specific, the EMBI 
and global and international, VIX, have similar effects to that of the entire sample. 
Increases in domestic risk increase the likelihood of voting for the left: the logic of 
deteriorating economic conditions applies here too. The higher the risk, the more likely 
one is to vote for the left (in all cases except 2006 the opposition). However, as the risk in 
the international environment increases, the less likely voters are to support the left. This 
is related to the rhetoric of the then incumbent PSDB party that economic turbulence, 
especially in 1998, was caused by international economic crises and that the Cardoso 
administration was the most capable to confront the crises. 
In 2002, when Lula da Silva from the PT won the elections, the only variables 
correlated with vote for the left in Brazil are those related to the international 
environment. Both commodity prices as well as international risk decrease the likelihood 
of voting for the left. Again, a risky international environment hurts the vote for the left.  
Finally, in 2006, two distinct models are estimated, one in which a lagged 
dependent variable is included to attenuate problems of serial correlation, quite high in 
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this panel. As unemployment increases, vote intentions for the PT are negatively affected. 
As inflation and the EMBI increase, the more likely voters are to support the PT. These 
results are hard to explain, because they show that voters are not necessarily punishing 
the incumbent party for increases in inflation and risk, but are on unemployment. A 
possible explanation is that left-wing supporters care only about reducing unemployment 
even if this leads to increases in inflation, which does follow expectations of the partisan 
hypotheses. Another possible explanation is that Lula was indeed successful in reducing 
inflation and country risk during his first mandate far more than many had expected. As a 
result, even if these numbers increased, the increase was slight compared to expectations 
and the events of 2002. 
(table 2 here) 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis shows that the effect of the economic variables on vote for left-wing 
parties varies tremendously by the characteristics of the election. In Mexico, economic 
performance has not been influential in affecting vote intentions for the PRD. Political 
and institutional variables seem more important in Mexico. At the same time, in the 
absence of an incumbent government of the left to analyze, and with only two 
presidential elections occurring during its ‘democratic period,’ it is difficult to make any 
generalizable claims about the Mexican case.  
In Brazil, the effects of economic variables are more tangible. There is partial 
support for hypotheses based on the traditional economic vote as well as hypotheses 
related to partisan explanations. PT voters in Brazil care about unemployment which 
follows the partisan model in that issues of development and employment are more 
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important for left-wing party supporters than other factors. Interestingly, voters behave as 
though there is a Philips Curve (Stokes 2001) in avoiding the left when inflation increases 
in 1994 and 1998 but they are less effected in 2006 once inflation is largely under control 
(Spanakos and Renno 2006). 
Overall, there is considerable causal heterogeneity by election, which signals that 
voters employ distinct vote calculi in the different elections, depending on economic 
conditions and what party is the incumbent. The complexity of economic conditions in 
Latin America, even post-stabilization plans, still requires combining distinct 
explanations on how the economy affects vote intentions. This is especially important 
because the viable presidential candidates in Brazil and Mexico are from political parties 
with long histories and relatively deep levels of institutionalization, something that is not 
found in other countries in the region. That vote intention is so complicated in even these 
cases suggests that it may be equally so across the region and that truly no single theory 
explains all cases adequately. 
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Table 1: FGLS coeficients for Vote for Left-Wing Parties in Brazil (1994-2006) and 
Mexico (2000-2006). 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Brazil Mexico 
Unemployment 0.63 0.74 0.37 
 (0.51) (0.65) (0.94) 
Consumer Price Index 0.15 0.08 0.32 
 (0.06)** (0.12) (0.67) 
Exchange Rate -2.76 -3.67 -4.51 
 (1.81) (3.22) (2.98) 
EMBI 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00)** (0.00)* (0.01) 
pallfnfw -0.02 -0.08 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04)* (0.06) 
VIX -0.45 -0.46 -0.67 
 (0.10)*** (0.14)*** (0.18)*** 
Central Bank 
Independence 
0.61 0.84 0.24 
 (0.16)*** (0.21)*** (0.50) 
Age of Party System -1.19 -0.13 -0.33 
 (0.47)** (1.24) (0.91) 
Mexico 25.87   
 (16.13)   
Constant 31.92 23.82 42.72 
 (7.85)*** (11.44)** (92.49) 
Observations 311 143 168 
Number of electioncode 6 4 2 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 2: Prais Winsten Coefficients for Vote for Left-Wing Parties by Elections: Brazil 
and Mexico. 
 Mexico 
2000 
Mexico 
2006 
Brazil 
1994-1998 
Brazil 
2002 
Brazil 
2006 
Brazil 
2006A 
Lag Vote Left      0.55 
      (0.10)*** 
Unemployment 3.06 0.52 1.68 4.94 -6.17 -6.92 
 (2.64) (0.35) (0.37)*** (3.56) (5.51) (3.37)** 
Consumer 
Price Index 
 -3.60 -0.99 -0.97 8.25 7.13 
  (3.35) (0.27)*** (2.06) (6.33) (3.83)* 
Exchange Rate 3.89  51.62 -0.46 5.57 4.99 
 (9.04)  (15.59)*** (5.97) (22.85) (36.51) 
EMBI -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.12 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)* (0.00) (0.10) (0.07)* 
pallfnfw 0.17 -0.13 0.23 -0.58 0.15 0.21 
 (0.30) (0.09) (0.30) (0.21)*** (0.17) (0.13) 
VIX -0.12 -0.12 -0.56 -0.29 -0.58 -0.12 
 (1.27) (0.38) (0.18)*** (0.17)* (0.71) (0.59) 
Central Bank 
Independence 
0.49 0.14 0.09 3.58 -1.12 -1.78 
 (0.20)** (0.64) (0.46) (2.15) (1.98) (1.28) 
Party System 
Age 
-4.27 9.33 6.11  3.33  
 (2.46)* (3.20)*** (2.07)***  (6.65)  
Constant 83.72 21.14 -65.11 44.96 -1,284.25 -1,038.97 
 (92.38) (335.01) (45.76) (173.95) (1,039.17) (606.99)* 
Observations 95 73 38 60 45 44 
R-squared 0.25 0.47 0.87 0.14 0.71 0.89 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
                                                
i It is measured in terms of basis points (bps) where 100 basis points is the equivalent of 1 
percent. 
ii When there is greater liquidity, interest in investing in emerging markets, or when 
commodity prices are high, investors will be less exacting. Perception that certain other 
countries or regions are ‘hot,’ can reduce market demand for the debt of a particular 
country and increase ‘risk.’ Similarly, internal dynamics of capital markets can punish 
one country for the failures of another, ironically even if the former is seen as relatively 
successful. This was the case in 2001, when traders who lost money or could not sell 
Argentine debt sold Brazilian debt to cover their losses, increasing Brazil’s EMBI.  
iii The dependent and independent variables were tested for unit root problems using the 
Dickey-Fuller test and detected problems only in the CPI variable. Given that it did not 
present consistent effects on EMBI, it does not appear to be a substantial problem. A 
violation of homoskedasticity was detected  in the pooled sample using the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as well as a problem o first order 
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correlation using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. This was correct 
by using Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression for the pooled data and Prais-
Winsten AR(1) regression for country-specific analysis.  
iv Unfortunately, due to collinearity problems, this variable was dropped in the 2002 
elections. 
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